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Abstract 
This paper aims to form a starting point for a discussion of the regulation of paid clinical research volunteers 
(professional volunteers) in New Zealand. It will argue that professional volunteers, who are currently unregulated 
as a class of research participants, present unique issues which are not addressed by existing regulation. The major 
arguments will be that: by restricting the value of financial compensation that can be provided for volunteering in a 
clinical trial, existing regulation allows professional volunteers to be exploited; professional volunteers are exposed 
to unregulated compounded risks and it is unlikely that they are properly informed of these risks; and in failing to 
recognise the existence of professional volunteers, current regulation fails to address their commodification and 
dehumanisation. Proposals to address these issues will be evaluated through a human rights lens for consistency 
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 
1996. Recommendations for reform will be put forward on the basis of this analysis.  
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,280 words. 
 
 
Subjects and Topics 
Human rights – medical experimentation 
Clinical research – research ethics 
Medical law – health consumer rights 
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I Introduction 
 
Human medical experimentation is necessary for medical progress.1 Throughout the world, 
participants enrol in clinical trials so that new drugs can be tested for safety and efficacy. 
Payment for research participation, while a longstanding practice, is becoming increasingly 
common.2 The focus of this paper is on research participants who repeatedly volunteer in clinical 
trials for the financial compensation provided for participation (professional volunteers). These 
individuals are known in the industry as “professional guinea pigs”.3 
 
In his text “The Professional Guinea Pig”, Roberto Abadie (Abadie) presents the results of his 
ethnographic research into self-identified professional guinea pigs in Philadelphia from 2003-
2004.4 From his research Abadie makes the following conclusion:5  
 
…being paid to test drug safety has become an essential part of the clinical drug trial 
enterprise in America. Pharmaceutical companies depend upon paid subjects to test an ever 
increasing number of drugs coming out of their “pipeline”, and subjects see their 
participation not as an altruistic gesture but as their job, a particular kind of trade with some 
resemblance to a mild torture economy in which bodily pain, boredom, and compliance are 
exchanged for money… 
 
Abadie’s thesis is that unique issues arise in the case of professional guinea pigs which need to 
be addressed by United States regulation. In particular, he is concerned by the exploitation and 
dehumanisation of volunteers, the exposure of volunteers to the “cumulative result of drug 
interactions resulting from years of trial participation”, and the pharmaceutical industry’s denial 
of their commodification.6 The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether New Zealand’s 
regulatory framework adequately addresses these issues and to provide recommendations for 
change where necessary.  
 
  
1 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human 
Subjects (adopted by the 18th WMA General Assembly, Helsinki, Finland, June 1964) at A(5).  
2 Neal Dickert and Christine Grady “Incentives for Research Participants” in Ezekiel J Emanuel and others The 
Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) at 386. 
3 At 386. 
4 Roberto Abadie The Professional Guinea Pig: Big Pharma and the Risky World of Human Subjects (Duke 
University Press, Durham, 2010) at 3.  
5 At 2. 
6 At 157-158. 
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The general argument will be that current regulation does not adequately address the issues 
presented by professional volunteers. This paper will present different options for addressing this 
problem and will evaluate these options through a human rights lens by assessing them for 
consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Code of Health and Disability 
Services Consumers’ Rights 1996 (Code of Rights). In light of this analysis, this paper will 
provide recommendations on how the regulatory framework could be amended to better address 
the rights of professional volunteers and to ensure that research is ethical.  
 
Given the specialised nature of this topic, some background information may be required to 
enable the reader to engage with the issues presented in this paper. Part II therefore begins by 
explaining what a clinical trial involves, providing information on professional volunteers in 
New Zealand and giving an outline of the regulatory framework applying to clinical research. 
Part III will provide further detail on the specific instruments which protect research participants’ 
rights and regulate research ethics. Part IV will introduce the reader to the basic principles of 
ethical decision-making and will highlight the dominance of autonomy in this area. The 
balancing of autonomy against other interests will form an underlying theme of this paper. Part V 
will establish that the existing regulatory framework does not adequately address the issues 
presented by professional volunteers. It will argue that: by restricting the value of financial 
compensation that can be provided for volunteering in a clinical trial, existing regulation allows 
professional volunteers to be exploited; professional volunteers are exposed to unregulated 
compounded risks and it is unlikely that they are properly informed of these risks; and in failing 
to recognise the existence of professional volunteers, current regulation fails to address their 
commodification and dehumanisation. Part V will include a discussion of different proposals for 
addressing these issues, and will evaluate these options for consistency with the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Code of Rights. The recommendations resulting from this 
discussion will be presented in Part VI.  
 
Professional volunteers are not currently regulated or even recognised as a class of research 
participants in New Zealand. This paper recommends that this needs to change, but it does not 
intend to provide a definitive answer to all the issues presented by professional volunteers. The 
intention is to demonstrate that professional volunteers present issues which warrant further 
examination. As such, the recommendations in this paper are advanced on the basis that they can 
provide a starting point for discussion and further debate. This is only the beginning and there is 
still much to be ironed out, and no doubt other issues and arguments to consider.   
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II Background 
 
A Clinical Trial Definition  
 
Clinical trials test “health-related interventions”, such as medicines, devices or new procedures, 
on human participants in order to evaluate their effects on health outcomes.7 A clinical trial is 
generally split into four phases.8 A Phase I study tests the health-related intervention for the first 
time in humans. Typically, Phase I studies are non-therapeutic, in the sense that they are 
conducted on healthy “volunteers” (healthy participants are generally referred to as volunteers)9 
who will not receive any direct therapeutic benefit from participating in the study. One of the 
purposes of a Phase I study is to test the toxicity of the intervention in humans.10 Phase II and III 
studies test the intervention on patients who are afflicted with the condition that the intervention 
aims to treat or prevent. Participants in these studies therefore hold the prospect of a therapeutic 
benefit. Purposes of Phase II and III studies include establishing efficacy (whether the 
intervention works) and optimum dosage.11 Results of Phase I, II and III studies are necessary to 
gain regulatory approval for the intervention. Phase IV studies test the intervention post 
regulatory approval.12 
 
This paper is restricted to a discussion of first-in-human Phase I clinical trials of medicines in 
healthy volunteers, that is, trials that test drugs in humans for the first time. Healthy volunteers 
present an interesting case study because, as this paper will explain,13 these participants expose 
themselves to significantly higher risks than other types of trial participants, without the prospect 
of any direct therapeutic benefit.  
 
B The Professional Volunteer 
 
Volunteers may be motivated by altruism, financial gain and/or indebtedness to the researcher (in 
the case of volunteers who are students or employees of the researcher) to participate in a study 
  
7 National Ethics Advisory Committee Ethical Guidelines for Intervention Studies: Revised edition (Ministry of 
Health, July 2012) at 39. 
8 At 39. 
9 Gerhard Nahler Dictionary of Pharmaceutical Medicine (2nd ed, Springer, Vienna, 2009) at 190. 
10 National Ethics Advisory Committee, above n 7, at 40.  
11 At 40-41.  
12 At 41. 
13 See Part V(B)1(a). 
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in which they will receive no therapeutic benefit.14 The focus of this paper is on volunteers who 
repeatedly participate in clinical trials, primarily or solely because of the financial compensation 
provided for participation (professional volunteers).  
 
Abadie’s book presents a convincing argument for regulating professional volunteers in the 
United States. While Abadie acknowledges that there is no reliable data on the number of paid 
trial participants in the United States,15 the number is likely to be significant. In the United 
States, thousands of Phase I studies are open for recruitment at any point in time and the 
government administers an easily accessible centralised database of clinical trials which allows 
volunteers to shop around for the best trials.16 This creates the ideal environment for professional 
volunteers, who form a self-defined and vocal group of trial volunteers in the United States.17  
 
In New Zealand the position is considerably different. New Zealand’s population is much 
smaller, and there are far fewer New Zealand based pharmaceutical companies. On average, only 
12.5 Phase I clinical trials are approved each year in New Zealand.18 It is impossible to estimate 
the number of individuals who participate in these trials, let alone the number of professional 
volunteers. While clinical trials must get approval before they are conducted in New Zealand, 
there is no centralised registry of trial participants and no way of monitoring how many trials 
volunteers participate in. The author has been unable to find any information on professional 
volunteers in New Zealand, although it is likely that they are a small population. The first 
recommendation of this paper is therefore that empirical research into professional volunteers in 
New Zealand should be conducted, so that regulators can have a better understanding of the 
impact of the issues addressed in this paper.  
 
  
14 CL Tishler and S Bartholomae “The recruitment of normal healthy volunteers: A review of the literature on the 
use of financial incentives” (2002) 42 J Clin Pharmacol 365 cited in CL Tishler and S Bartholomae “Repeat 
participation among normal healthy research volunteers: professional guinea pigs in clinical trials?” (2003) 46(4) 
Perspect Biol Med 508 at 510. 
15 Abadie, above n 4, at 12. 
16 U.S. National Institutes of Health “ClinicalTrials.gov” <www.clinicaltrials.gov>. 
17 See generally Jim Hogshire Sell Yourself to Science: A Complete Guide to Selling Your Body Organs, Body 
Fluids, Bodily Functions and Being a Human Guinea Pig (Loompanics Unlimited, Port Townsend, 1992); and 
Robert Helms “Guinea Pig Zero: An Anthology of the Journal for Human Research Subjects” Guinea Pig Zero 
<www.guineapigzero.com>. 
18 Email from Susan Issacs (Standing Committee on Therapeutic Trials administrator) to Malisa Mulholland 
regarding the average number of Phase I studies approved by the Standing Committee on Therapeutic Trials per year 
(23 June 2013) (Obtained under Official Information Act 1982 Request to the Standing Committee on Therapeutic 
Trials). 
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It is clear that New Zealand does offer opportunities for paid participation in clinical trials and 
that there are no limits on the number of trials volunteers can participate in. There are several 
dedicated clinical research service providers in New Zealand, which offer opportunities to 
healthy volunteers. For example: Auckland Clinical Studies has conducted 46 Phase I studies and 
boasts a volunteer database of more than 3,500 names;19 and Christchurch Clinical Studies Trust 
has conducted over 115 studies, the majority of which have been Phase I trials in healthy 
volunteers.20 Auckland Clinical Studies and Christchurch Clinical Studies Trust, like other 
clinical research service providers, invite potential volunteers to sign up online to their volunteer 
databases, which allow prospective volunteers to be contacted about future clinical trials. The 
websites of both organisations make it clear that “reimbursement” will be given to volunteers to 
compensate them for the “inconvenience” of participation.21 It therefore appears to be relatively 
easy to become a professional volunteer in New Zealand and, by having volunteer databases, 
clinical research service providers appear to welcome this. A recent Stuff article on “human 
guinea pigs” interviewed four New Zealand volunteers, two of whom had participated in 
multiple trials. One of the volunteers, described as a “regular”, reported receiving $10,900 for his 
recent participation in three trials.22 Further, in a 2008 study on New Zealand university students 
volunteering for clinical trials, thirteen of the eighteen volunteers interviewed had participated in 
more than one trial.23  
 
Even if New Zealand does not currently have a significant population of professional volunteers, 
this is likely to change. Not only do clinical trials advance medical science, they can also 
generate income for the public health system.24 It has been estimated that, by 2020, New Zealand 
could be generating $250 million annually from clinical trials (given the appropriate 
environment).25 This is part of the reason why Parliament’s Health Select Committee conducted 
an inquiry into improving New Zealand’s environment to support clinical trials.26 The 2011 
report of the Inquiry recommended various changes to make New Zealand a more attractive 
  
19 Auckland Clinical Studies “About ACS” <www.clinicalstudies.co.nz>; and Auckland Clinical Studies 
“Completed & Ongoing Studies” <www.clinicalstudies.co.nz>. 
20 Christchurch Clinical Studies Trust “Studies” <www.ccst.co.nz>. 
21 Christchurch Clinical Studies Trust “Reimbursement” <www.ccst.co.nz>; and Auckland Clinical Studies 
“Reimbursement” <www.clinicalstudies.co.nz>. 
22 Nikki Macdonald “The human guinea pigs” (12 August 2012) stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>. 
23 Tolich M “What if Institutional Research Boards (IRBs) treated healthy volunteers in clinical trials as their 
clients?”(2010) 3(12) AMJ 767 at 767. 
24 See Lyn Murphy and Dr William Maguire “Quantifying the Benefits and Costs of Conducting Sponsored Clinical 
Trials: Some Preliminary Results” (paper presented to the Auckland Region Accounting Conference, 2010). 
25 Health Committee Inquiry into improving New Zealand’s environment to support innovation through clinical 
trials (June 2011) at 12.  
26 At 13. 
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country for pharmaceutical companies to conduct trials in, so that these economic benefits could 
be realised.27 The Government has been largely receptive to the report, and has already taken 
action on a number of its recommendations.28 It is therefore possible that clinical trials will 
become a growing enterprise in New Zealand in the years to come. With more clinical trials on 
offer the number of professional volunteers is likely to increase.  
 
C Outline of the Regulatory Framework 
 
The Medicines Act 1981 governs the regulation of therapeutic products in New Zealand. 
Importantly for our purposes, it prohibits the sale, distribution or advertisement of new 
medicines without the consent of the Minister of Health.29 This general prohibition is subject to 
an exemption for approved clinical trials.30 A clinical trial is therefore unlawful unless it can fall 
within this exemption.31 In practice, clinical trial approval requires both scientific and ethical 
approval. These are two separate approval processes, which are not governed by a single 
instrument.32 
 
The New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority (Medsafe, a business unit of 
the Ministry of Health) administers the scientific approval of clinical trials under the Medicines 
Act 1981.33 Section 30 of the Medicines Act 1981 requires clinical trials to be approved by the 
Director-General of Health, on the recommendation of the Health Research Council of New 
Zealand. The Health Research Council has delegated its power of recommendation to its 
Standing Committee on Therapeutic Trials. This Standing Committee conducts a “scientific 
assessment” of clinical trial applications for the purpose of making a recommendation under s 
  
27 At 17. 
28 Government Response to Report of the Health Committee on its Inquiry into improving New Zealand 's 
environment to support innovation through clinical trials, presented to the House of Representatives in accordance 
with Standing Order 248 (J.1) (6 September 2011). 
29 Medicines Act 1981, s 20.  
30 Section 30.  
31 Nicola Peart, Fiona McCrimmon and John Dawson “Clinical Trials” in John Dawson and Nicola Peart The Law of 
Research: a guide (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2003) at 176. 
32 New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority Guideline on the Regulation of Therapeutic 
Products in New Zealand: Part 11: Clinical trials - regulatory approval and good clinical practice requirements, 
Edition 1.3 (Ministry of Health, November 2012) at 4.  
33 At 4. 
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30.34 It is not tasked with considering issues outside this ambit, such as ethical or human rights 
issues.35 
 
Ethical approval for clinical trials is conducted by health and disability ethics committees (ethics 
committees).36 There are four committees, established under the New Zealand Public Health and 
Disability Act 2000.37 Their function is to ensure that research complies with the ethical 
standards promulgated by the National Ethics Advisory Committee and to grant ethical approval 
accordingly.38 The New Zealand Ethical Guidelines for Intervention Studies (the Ethical 
Guidelines) apply to clinical trials.39  
 
Once approved, trial volunteers’ rights are protected through various laws and guidelines, which 
regulate research at both an international and domestic level. Most relevant to this paper are the 
Ethical Guidelines, the Code of Rights and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. These 
instruments, and their applicability to research, will be discussed below in Part III.  
 
III Relevant Instruments 
 
A The Ethical Guidelines  
 
The most exhaustive statement of researcher obligations and research participant protections in 
New Zealand is found in the Ethical Guidelines. These Guidelines supplement the law, providing 
comprehensive ethical standards for research (65 pages) to address the unique ethical issues 
which arise from medical experimentation on humans. The Guidelines are based on various 
international ethical standards for research.40 One of the key objectives of the Ethical Guidelines 
is to “safeguard the rights and interests of participants in research and innovative practice”.41 
  
34 Health Research Council of New Zealand “Committees” <www.hrc.govt.nz>. 
35 Health Research Council of New Zealand Standing Committee on Therapeutic Trials: Terms of Reference (New 
Zealand Government).   
36 New Zealand Medicines and Medical Devices Safety Authority, above n 32, at 4. 
37 New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 11; and Health and Disability Ethics Committees “About 
the Committees” (26 October 2012)  <ethics.health.govt.nz>.  
38 Health and Disability Ethics Committees Terms of Reference: Northern A Health and Disability Ethics Committee 
at 1; Health and Disability Ethics Committees Terms of Reference: Northern B Health and Disability Ethics 
Committee at 1; Health and Disability Ethics Committees Terms of Reference: Central Health and Disability Ethics 
Committee at 1; and Health and Disability Ethics Committees Terms of Reference: Southern Health and Disability 
Ethics Committee at 1. 
39 National Ethics Advisory Committee, above n 7, at 5.  
40 At 1. 
41 At iii. 
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The Ethical Guidelines are relevant at two stages of the clinical trial process. Firstly, as 
explained above,42 ethics committees must review clinical research for consistency with the 
Ethical Guidelines before it can be conducted in New Zealand. Secondly, the Guidelines apply to 
researchers when conducting clinical trials.43 
 
The Ethical Guidelines offer no specific guidance on professional volunteers (despite making 
special provisions for research involving children and young people, research involving people 
with intellectual disabilities, research involving unconscious participants, research involving 
consumers with a terminal illness, research involving older persons and research involving 
students, employees and prison inmates).44 The only guidance available on professional 
volunteers is that which applies to research participants generally. Professional volunteers are 
therefore currently unregulated as a specific class of research participants.  
 
Applicable provisions of the Ethical Guidelines will be discussed as they become relevant to the 
arguments presented below. At this stage, however, it is useful to note that the Ethical Guidelines 
are based on the following “underlying ethical considerations”:45 
 
• Respect for persons, incorporating respect for autonomy and protection of 
people.46 
• Justice, requiring that “within a population there is a fair distribution of 
the benefits and burdens of participation in a study and, for any 
participant, a balance of burdens and benefits.”47 
• Beneficence and non-maleficence, referring to the respective “moral 
obligation[s] to act in a way that will benefit others…[and] not to inflict 
harm on others”.48 
• Integrity, encompassing the researcher’s “commitment to the advancement 
of knowledge”.49 
• Diversity, requiring respect and recognition of diversity among research 
participants.50 
  
42 See Part II(C). 
43 National Ethics Advisory Committee, above n 7, at 3.  
44 At 46-61.  
45 At 8. 
46 At 8. 
47 At 8. 
48 At 9.  
49 At 9. 
50 At 10. 
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• Addressing conflict of interest.51 
 
These underlying considerations will be useful in critiquing current regulation and evaluating the 
proposals put forward to address the issues set out below.52  
 
While both the Code of Rights and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 also protect the rights 
of research participants,53 the Ethical Guidelines are “the most effective means of preventing 
potential harm resulting from medical and scientific research on humans”.54 The Guidelines form 
the primary means through which research is regulated in New Zealand. They apply at the 
approval stage and can therefore act to prevent rights issues occurring by prohibiting unethical 
research. Further, researchers may be subject to disciplinary actions by their employers for 
breaching the Guidelines, and medical and scientific journals are likely to refuse to publish 
research which results from unethical research.55 Most of the recommendations of this paper will 
therefore be targeted at improving the Ethical Guidelines.  
 
B The Code of Rights 
 
The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 sets up the office of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner and provides for the establishment of the Code of Rights. The Code came into 
force as a regulation under the Act in 1996.56 It provides the following ten rights of consumers 
and corresponding duties of providers, which apply to consumers and providers of health and 
disability services:57  
 
• Right 1 – Right to be Treated with Respect. 
• Right 2 – Right to Freedom from Discrimination, Coercion, Harassment, 
and Exploitation. 
• Right 3 – Right to Dignity and Independence. 
• Right 4 – Right to Services of an Appropriate Standard. 
• Right 5 – Right to Effective Communication. 
  
51 At 10. 
52 See Part V. 
53 See Parts III(B) and (C).  
54 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2005) at 249 
55 At 250. 
56 Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1996, s 74(1); and Health and Disability Commissioner “The Code of 
Rights” <www.hdc.org.nz>. 
57 Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 1994, cl 1.  
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• Right 6 – Right to be Fully Informed. 
• Right 7 – Right to Make an Informed Choice and Give Informed Consent. 
• Right 8 – Right to Support. 
• Right 9 – Rights in Respect of Teaching or Research. 
• Right 10 – Right to Complain. 
 
The Code applies to professional volunteers and researchers through right 9, which extends the 
rights in the Code “to those occasions when a consumer is participating in, or it is proposed that 
a consumer participate in, teaching or research”. There have been no Health and Disability 
Commissioner cases specifically concerning clinical trial participation and the Health and 
Disability Commissioner has not released any guidance on this matter, so it is difficult to 
determine how the Code of Rights applies to the unique issues arising in the case of professional 
volunteers. Some of the rights in the Code are, however, particularly relevant to the issues 
addressed below, and will therefore form part of the analysis of the problem of the professional 
volunteer.58 
 
Right 7, the right to make an informed choice and give informed consent, will form the basis of 
much the discussion in this paper. A review of the Health and Disability Commissioner’s 
decisions and publications shows “three essential elements” embody informed consent under the 
Code of Rights: “effective communication”, “disclosure of adequate information”, and a 
“voluntary decision by a competent consumer”.59 Effective communication is protected as a 
stand-alone right in the Code of Rights, which requires health service providers to communicate 
information in way that health service consumers can understand.60 Competence is expanded 
upon within right seven, which provides for the presumption of competence and gives guidance 
for cases in which a consumer may not be competent or may have diminished competence. 
Disclosure of adequate information and voluntary decision-making are directly relevant to the 
issues addressed in this paper. These elements of informed consent will therefore be considered 
in detail below.61  
  
58 See Part V.  
59 Health and Disability Commissioner Anaesthetist/Hospital (Public) (05HDC07699, 31 August 2006); Health and 
Disability Commissioner General Surgeon/Hospital (Private) (03HDC19128, 14 September 2004); Health and 
Disability Commissioner Gynaecologist/Health Centre (01HDC01835, 30 June 2003); Health and Disability 
Commissioner Surgeon (97HDC9370, 23 April 1999); Health and Disability Commissioner Neurosurgeon 
(98HDC13693, 6 December 2000); and Katharine Greig, Legal Manager “Informed consent in the Code of Health 
and Disability Services Consumer Rights” (presentation to the 8th Annual Medico-legal conference, 8 February 
2000). 
60 Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, cl 2, right 5. 
61 See Part V. 
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C The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
 
Section 10 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides every person with the right not 
to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation without that person’s consent (s 10). The 
key issues to be addressed by this paper are whether professional volunteers’ apparent consent to 
medical experimentation constitutes legally effective consent and whether there any 
circumstances which justify overriding a professional volunteer’s valid consent. As discussed 
above,62 the Code of Rights protects the right to informed consent. This right clearly applies to 
professional volunteers and it sets a relatively demanding and well prescribed standard as to what 
constitutes informed consent.63 The issue to be considered by this part of the paper is whether s 
10 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 will add anything relevant to this paper’s analysis 
of the issues presented by professional volunteers,64 which is not addressed by the Code of 
Rights.65 
 
1 Section 10 and the definition of consent 
 
There is a lack of useful commentary and jurisprudence on the meaning of consent for the 
purposes of the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation without 
consent. At an international level, this is likely to be a result of s 10 being relatively unique to 
New Zealand (only Fiji and South Africa have comparable rights).66 Section 10 originates from, 
but is intentionally different to, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 (ICCPR).67 Article 7 links the right against experimentation to the right to freedom 
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by providing that:68 
 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation. 
 
  
62 See Part III(B). 
63 PDG Skegg “Consent and Information Disclosure” in John Dawson and Nicola Peart The Law of Research: a 
guide (University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2003) at 241.  
64 See Part V.  
65 Note that an analysis of the different remedies available under the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 
and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is outside the scope of this paper. 
66 PF v Capital and Coast District Health Board [2013] NZHC 1792 at [31]; and Butler and Butler, above n 54, at 
247. 
67 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper” [1984–1985] I AJHR A6 at 108. 
68 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976), art 7. 
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By contrast, in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the right not to be subjected to torture 
or cruel treatment is a separate right from the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific 
experimentation without consent.69 According to the drafters of “A Bill of Rights For New 
Zealand: A White Paper” article 7 of the ICCPR linked the two rights together to ensure that 
only experiments which fell within cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment were forbidden. The 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was intentionally drafted to separate article 7 into two 
separate rights, thereby ensuring protection against all non-consensual experimentation, 
regardless of whether it can be characterised as cruel, degrading or inhuman.70  
 
Very few New Zealand cases have interpreted or applied s 10, and those that have considered it 
have focused on the definition of scientific or medical experimentation, not consent.71 By 
contrast, the Code of Rights sets out comprehensive standards as to what constitutes informed 
consent, and there have been numerous Health and Disability Commissioner decisions which 
have interpreted and applied the right to informed consent.72 In the clinical research context, it 
would be odd if consent under s 10 were to be interpreted differently from informed consent 
under the Code of Rights, so that there could be consent for the purposes of s 10, but not for the 
purposes of the right to informed consent under the Code of Rights. Therefore, it is likely that 
consent for the purposes of s 10 requires fulfilment of the same essential elements as the right to 
informed consent under the Code of Rights - that is, effective communication, disclosure of 
adequate information, and a voluntary decision by a competent consumer. 
 
2 A purposive approach to section 10 
 
In Brooker v Police, Thomas J emphasised dignity and human worth as the key values 
underlying the rights in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. In particular, he noted, with 
respect to s 10, that “subjecting a person to medical or scientific experimentation…without 
consent intrudes upon that person's freedom of will to determine his or her own fate as part of 
their essential dignity”.73 On the basis that the rights in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
  
69 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 9 and 10. 
70 Geoffrey Palmer, above n 67, at 108.  
71 PF v Capital and Coast District Health Board, above n 66, at [30]-[32]; McGrath v Police HC Auckland CRI-
2011-404-110, 20 December 2011 at [39]; S v W HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-3775, 7 December 2011 at [66]; 
Taunoa v Attorney-General (2004) 7 HRNZ 379 at [298]-[303]; WATCH (Waikato Against Toxic and Chemical 
Hazards) Inc v Attorney- General HC Hamilton CIV-2003-419-1265, 29 October 2003 at [73]; Down v Van de 
Wetering [1999] 2 NZLR 631 at 9; Pio v Police HC Rotorua AP43/94, 4 July 1995 at 4; Pio v Police HC Rotorua 
AP43/94, 13 February 1995 at 4-5; and R v Salmond [1992] 3 NZLR 8. 
72 See Part III(B). 
73 Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30, [2007] 3 NZLR 91 at [180]. 
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are derived from human dignity, in their commentary on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
Andrew and Petra Butler take a purposive approach to the interpretation of s 10, by arguing that 
a person should not be able to consent to an experiment that robs them of their dignity:74  
 
…to give full effect to the protection section 10 of the Bill of Rights Act is supposed to 
afford, a paternalistic approach should be taken and the concept of consent should be 
interpreted as not including consent to an inhuman, cruel or degrading medical or scientific 
experimentation. A free and democratic society cannot allow its members to become the 
object of such medical experiments since that robs the person of his or her dignity. As the 
Preamble of the ICCPR acknowledges dignity is the inherent human right from which all 
other rights are derived. A state which would allow its members to alienate their right to 
dignity would be at risk of not protecting or taking seriously other rights.  
 
With respect, this is a difficult argument to apply in practice. The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 does not include a free-standing right to dignity, but it does include a right not to be 
subjected to medical or scientific experimentation without consent. As explained above,75 the 
drafting history of s 10 illustrates that consent is fundamental to this right. In this context, in the 
author’s opinion, s 10 should be interpreted according to its plain meaning so that legally 
effective consent to medical or scientific experimentation is sufficient to ensure that s 10 is not 
breached. Therefore, as long as a professional volunteer gives valid consent to participate in a 
clinical trial (according to the interpretation advanced above),76 there can be no breach of s 10. 
This is consistent with the dicta cited from Thomas J above, which indicates that in the context 
of s 10, if autonomy is overridden, so is dignity. This is also consistent with the position of 
medical ethics, which considers respect for autonomy (which forms the primary justification for 
informed consent)77 to be a “component of respect for human dignity”.78  
 
3 The application of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to the Ethical Guidelines 
 
Given the discussion above, s 10 does not appear to add any requirements relevant to 
professional volunteers’ consent to medical experimentation that are not addressed by the 
comprehensive provisions of the Code of Rights. Nevertheless, this part of the paper will argue 
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75 See Part III(C)(1). 
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that s 10 is still relevant to the discussion in this paper by virtue of s 3 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, which provides for the Act’s application: 
 
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done— 
(a) by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand; or 
(b) by any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty 
conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to law. 
 
The Ethical Guidelines were made by the National Ethics Advisory Committee, pursuant to the 
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.79 If this function falls within the scope of s 
3, by law the Ethical Guidelines will need to be evaluated for consistency with s 10 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. By contrast, there is no legal requirement that the Ethical 
Guidelines must be consistent with the Code of Rights.  
 
The act of the National Ethics Advisory Committee determining the Ethical Guidelines could 
potentially fall within paragraph (a) of s 3, as an act done by the executive, or paragraph (b) of s 
3, as a public function imposed on the Committee by law. There is limited case law on the 
definition of “executive” for the purposes of s 3.80 Given the relatively wide scope of paragraph 
(b), the practice of the courts has been to apply this paragraph and avoid a definition of 
“executive”. In Federated Farmers v New Zealand Post, for example, rather than holding New 
Zealand Post (a state owned enterprise) to be part of the executive, McGechan J reasoned that 
“the question more naturally arises under s 3(b)”.81 The National Ethics Advisory Committee is a 
ministerial advisory committee established by the Minister of Health under s 16 of the New 
Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.82 The Committee, which is accountable to the 
Minister of Health,83 could potentially fall within the meaning of executive, but given that the 
courts’ default approach appears to be to apply s 3(b) instead, it is more likely that s 3 will be 
engaged through s 3(b). The function of the National Ethics Advisory Committee in determining 
the Ethical Guidelines undoubtedly falls within paragraph (b). This function is imposed on the 
National Ethics Advisory Committee by law because it is a function required of the Committee 
under the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.84 With regards to whether the 
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function is “public”, in Federated Farmers v New Zealand Post McGechan J found that mail 
handling fell within the definition of “public function” because it “is carried out for the public, in 
the public interest, and moreover by a company which…is wholly owned and ultimately 
controlled by the Crown”.85 In Ransfield v The Radio Network Ltd, Randerson J put forward “a 
range of possible considerations” for determining whether a function is public, including whether 
the source of the function is statutory, the extent and nature of any governmental control of the 
entity and whether the function is being exercised in the broader public interest.86 Applying the 
reasoning of these cases, the function of the National Ethics Advisory Committee, in determining 
the Ethical Guidelines, must be a public function. The National Ethics Advisory Committee is a 
statutory body, accountable to the Ministry of Health and its statutory function of determining 
“nationally consistent ethical standards across the health sector” is for the public and in the 
public interest.87  
 
The Ethical Guidelines must therefore be consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990. Accordingly, the recommendations in this paper proposing amendments to the Ethical 
Guidelines will need to be evaluated for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, in particular, the right not to be subjected to medical experimentation without consent.  
 
IV Ethical Decision-Making and the Dominance of Autonomy 
 
Before this paper considers the problem of the professional volunteer and proposals for reform, it 
is helpful to first introduce the general ethical framework for decision-making in medical 
practice. This will influence the application and development of regulation in this area. 
 
A Ethical Regulation of Clinical Research 
 
Most professions have codes of ethical conduct, setting standards of proper behaviour for people 
in that profession.88 For medical practitioners in particular, medical ethics is a highly developed 
discipline which permeates all areas of clinical practice. Medical ethics provides a set of values 
and principles to guide and justify the action (or inaction) of practitioners.89 It is important to 
note that while medical ethics can, and does, influence the law and the interpretation of the law, 
medical ethics and the law (and in particular, the rights protected by law) are not the same 
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thing.90 Clinical research (which forms a discipline within medical practice) has traditionally 
been largely regulated by ethical codes, and despite the general increase in legislative regulation 
of medical practice, this continues to be the case. Numerous ethical codes for human 
experimentation, both national and international, have been developed over the last 60 years.91 
The Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki are probably the most cited international 
instruments. The Nuremberg Code was issued in 1947,92 in response to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed by Nazi physicians throughout world war two. The Code comes 
directly from the judgment of the Nuremberg trials, which sets out ten principles for ethical 
human experimentation.93 The Declaration of Helsinki, which was adopted by the World 
Medical Association in 1964, provides a more up-to-date international code, having been most 
recently amended in 2008.94 Many jurisdictions, including New Zealand,95 have incorporated the 
principles of these international codes into their own domestic standards.96 As already discussed, 
in New Zealand clinical research is largely governed by the Ethical Guidelines.97 
 
B Principles for Ethical Decision-Making  
 
The ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice provide a 
contemporary framework for ethical decision-making in medical practice.98 While these 
principles are applicable to medical ethics generally, they are particularly relevant to clinical 
research ethics. The principles originate from the Belmont Report,99 a 1978 report from the 
United States National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioural Research which provides basic moral principles for conducting research with 
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humans.100 Further, the principles have been directly incorporated into the Ethical Guidelines as 
underlying ethical considerations.101 This part of the paper will focus on autonomy, because this 
ethical principle, and the tension between it and other interests, forms the underlying theme of 
this paper.  
 
C The Dominance of Autonomy 
 
The principle of autonomy in medical ethics encompasses the notion that, as independent moral 
agents, patients (or more generally consumers of health services) are the best judge of what is in 
their own interests and should be able to make their own decisions about what will happen to 
their bodies.102 Respect for autonomy requires health service providers to respect these 
decisions,103 notwithstanding that a patient may choose a greater risk for himself/herself than 
others may choose for him/her. 104  
 
Respect for autonomy has become the overriding ethical principle of good medical practice.105 It 
has “dominated the control of medical practice [over] the last-half century” and is “by far the 
most significant value to have influenced the evolution of contemporary medical law”.106 The 
reign of autonomy has resulted in a wide spread rejection of the historic notion of medical 
paternalism, in which the “doctor always knew best” and patients were given limited 
information, and had little control over, their treatment.107 Autonomy is primarily recognised by 
the requirement that health consumers must give informed consent to health services. Health 
service providers are said to have a moral duty to obtain informed consent by virtue of their 
patient’s autonomous status.108 In New Zealand, informed consent is protected as a right under 
the Code of Rights.109 As we have seen, the Code of Rights applies to all consumers of health 
and disability services, including professional volunteers.110 Informed consent features as the 
first principle in the Nuremberg Code and forms much of the focus of the Declaration of 
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Helsinki.111 The Ethical Guidelines provide extensive guidance on informed consent,112 and the 
right against medical experimentation in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is subject to 
consent.113 Informed consent is therefore not only an important right in medical practice 
generally, but it also forms a dominant requirement of clinical research ethics. It is important to 
note that informed consent in research does not just protect against research without consent, it 
also empowers research volunteers to decide which trials they want to participate in and what 
level of risk they are willing to accept. By empowering volunteers to decide if and how they will 
get involved in research, informed consent respects individual autonomy.114  
 
In New Zealand, autonomy is particularly dominant because of the Cartwright Inquiry which, in 
part, blamed the paternalistic practices of health professionals for the “Unfortunate Experiment 
at National Women’s” Hospital.115 Informed consent and patient rights were central issues of the 
Cartwright Inquiry, which is described as the “watershed event in terms of doctors' attitudes to 
patients in New Zealand”.116 The Cartwright Report which resulted from this Inquiry prompted 
the enactment of the Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, under which the Code of 
Rights is made.117  
 
D Balancing Autonomy and Other Interests 
 
Despite its dominance, however, autonomy is not the only interest which regulation seeks to 
further. There are numerous examples of the law overriding individual autonomy, by limiting the 
power to give legally effective consent, which fall within the realm of medical ethics.118 For 
example, the Crimes Act 1961 specifically disavows the right to consent to the infliction of one’s 
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own death and precludes consent as a defence to female genital mutilation.119 The Human 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 prohibits and criminalises the commercial supply 
of human embryos or gametes and commercial surrogacy arrangements,120 and the Human 
Tissue Act 2008 generally prohibits and criminalises trading in human tissue.121  
 
This paper illustrates the tension between autonomy and other underlying ethical and regulatory 
objectives, in the context of the regulation of professional volunteers. There are three central 
issues to consider. Firstly, how can we regulate financial compensation to ensure that volunteers 
are neither unduly induced into volunteering, and therefore unable to give informed consent, nor 
exploited?122 Secondly, should volunteers be able to consent to expose themselves to 
compounded safety risks?123 Thirdly, should professional volunteers be able to consent to their 
commodification and dehumanisation?124  
 
V The Problem of the Professional Volunteer 
 
In his book “The Professional Guinea Pig”, Abadie raises a number of objections to the treatment 
of professional guinea pigs in the United States. In particular, he is concerned by the exploitation 
and dehumanisation of volunteers, the exposure of volunteers to the “cumulative result of drug 
interactions resulting from years of trial participation”, and the pharmaceutical industry’s denial 
of their commodification.125 The following paragraphs will argue that these issues also arise in 
New Zealand. Recommendations to amend the Ethical Guidelines to address these issues will be 
advanced. Where relevant, the recommendations will be analysed for consistency with the Code 
of Rights and s 10 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
 
A Exploitation 
 
Part 1 of this section will argue that the Ethical Guidelines, by limiting the value of financial 
compensation that can be provided to volunteers for participating in clinical trials, allow, and in 
some cases may require, clinical trials to exploit professional volunteers (the issue). The issue of 
exploitation in research is often raised in relation to enrolling the poor in clinical trials, and in 
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this context has been defined to mean a situation in which “A takes unfair advantage of B”.126 
The argument here is that a requirement limiting compensation is unfair, given the significant 
safety risks volunteers may be exposed to,127 and takes advantage of professional volunteers’ 
financial need. Put another way, the Ethical Guidelines allow for an “unfair distribution of harm 
and benefit between the two parties”.128 Researchers get the benefit of only having to pay limited 
compensation for volunteers’ invaluable role in research, while volunteers are paid a marginal 
amount for their exposure to considerable risks.  
 
Part 2 of this section will put forward and critique two proposals for addressing this issue of 
exploitation.  
 
1 Issue 
 
(a) Professional volunteers are likely to be poor 
 
Professional volunteers repeatedly participate in clinical trials, primarily or solely because of the 
financial compensation provided for participation. They have traditionally been broken into three 
groups: students, low-income unskilled workers and those who participate as means of 
maintaining a marginal lifestyle.129 The common feature of these groups is that they are all likely 
to be in need of money. While there is no reliable data on the demographics of Phase I trial 
volunteers, Abadie found that most of the volunteers he interviewed who regularly volunteered 
in trials were “poor and relatively uneducated”.130 These findings are consistent with a common 
sense approach. Participation in Phase I clinical trials is likely to be time consuming, so those 
with reliable full time employment are unlikely to be able to commit to it. Further, as we shall 
see, volunteers in Phase I trials are exposed to considerable safety risks,131 and it seems unlikely 
that anyone would be willing to expose themselves to such risks unless they needed the money. 
This is consistent with the findings of the Belmont Report (introduced in Part IV(B)) which 
recognised the risk of economically disadvantaged populations being targeted by research 
“owing to their ready availability” and “socioeconomic condition”.132 Researchers appear to be 
well aware of this and are not shy of targeting the economic underclass. For example, in the 
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United Kingdom, “The Big Issue” magazine, which is sold by homeless people, often includes 
advertisements for clinical research volunteers.133 In New Zealand, it is not uncommon for 
clinical research to target university students.134 
 
Targeting the poor in Phase I trials is an issue in itself. It means that poor individuals are 
overrepresented in research and that “an already disadvantaged segment of the population could 
bear a disproportionate share of the research burden”.135 This violates the principle of justice, an 
underlying consideration of the Ethical Guidelines, which requires that, “within a population, 
there is a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of participation in a study”.136 In the United 
States, federal regulations recognise “economically disadvantaged persons” as a “vulnerable 
population” and require research involving such persons to ensure that their selection is 
“equitable” and that “additional safeguards” are in place to protect their “rights and welfare.”137 
Although these protections have been criticised as being too vague,138 the United States still 
offers better protection for the economically disadvantaged in research than New Zealand. The 
New Zealand Ethical Guidelines do not even expressly recognise the economically 
disadvantaged as falling within the category of “vulnerable people”.139  
 
(b) The Ethical Guidelines limit financial compensation  
 
The financial compensation provided by clinical trials to volunteers must be disclosed to an 
ethics committee as part of the ethical approval process,140 so that it can be reviewed for 
consistency with the Ethical Guidelines.141 The Ethical Guidelines recognise that financial 
compensation (or “inducements”) can normally be ethically acceptable, but will be unacceptable 
if it amounts to “undue influence”.142 Undue influence is not expressly defined, but it seems to 
mean inducing a volunteer to participate against their better judgment, so that their decision is 
not voluntary and there is no informed consent.143 In stating that the “risks involved in 
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participation should be acceptable to participants even in the absence of any inducement”,144 the 
Ethical Guidelines indicate that if a volunteer is solely motivated by an inducement there will be 
undue influence. The Ethical Guidelines accordingly correlate undue influence with the value of 
the inducement,145 and only recognise payments of limited value, such as reimbursements of 
expenses (like travel costs), payment in recognition of time/inconvenience/discomfort or koha, as 
appropriate payments.146 There is therefore no requirement that volunteers must be paid at least 
minimum wage, and the general approach of the Ethical Guidelines suggests that it may be 
appropriate to pay volunteers less than minimum wage.  
 
(c) Limited compensation takes advantage of professional volunteers’ financial need 
 
The approach of the Ethical Guidelines to financial compensation does not accord with the 
reality of professional trial participation. Professional volunteers are not akin to other types of 
volunteers because they are primarily, if not solely, motivated to volunteer by financial reasons. 
Risks involved in participation are not acceptable to them in the absence of financial 
inducements, because the only reason for volunteering, and therefore accepting the risks, are the 
financial inducements. This problem is not solved by limiting the value of compensation that can 
be provided, because professional volunteers will still volunteer for the financial compensation, 
even if it is limited. As Abadie explains:147  
 
…a sum of money that the wealthy can easily resist may be very tempting for poorer people. 
Keeping payments low, however, seems unfair to the poor, who submit to trials precisely 
because they need the money. And whether or not such people are being unduly induced, the 
larger question is whether they are being exploited. 
 
It follows that the effect of keeping compensation low is that those who end up volunteering are 
those who are most in need of money – those who are willing to expose themselves to safety 
risks for less than minimum wage. This is illustrated by the recruitment practice of 
pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly, which is infamous for targeting homeless alcoholics by 
providing the lowest compensation in the industry.148 The Ethical Guidelines, therefore, in 
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encouraging researchers to limit financial inducements, allow research to exploit professional 
volunteers’ need for money. 
 
2 Proposals for reform 
 
The current regulatory framework for clinical research does not address the issue of exploitation 
of professional volunteers. While the Code of Rights does protect the right to be free from 
exploitation,149 the payment of limited compensation to professional volunteers is unlikely to be 
a breach of the Code of Rights. All obligations under the Code of Rights are subject to a standard 
of reasonableness.150 It would be very difficult to argue that researchers are acting unreasonably 
by following the Ethical Guidelines, which they must comply with under right 4 of the Code of 
Rights.  
 
This part of the paper will put forward and critique two proposals for addressing the issue of 
exploitation. Paragraph (a) will evaluate the option of prohibiting financial compensation and 
paragraph (b) will argue that the Ethical Guidelines should be amended to require financial 
payment to be fair.  
 
(a) Prohibit financial compensation 
 
If financial compensation for volunteering in clinical trials was prohibited, there would be no 
risk of volunteers being exploited or unduly influenced by financial compensation. Such a 
proposal, however appealing in theory, is probably unrealistic in practice. Prohibiting financial 
compensation would have the effect of prohibiting professional volunteering, and as Abadie 
explains, relying only on altruistic volunteers is problematic:151 
 
Maintaining phase I trials but ending financial compensation so that all volunteers were 
altruistic would not work either. This solution might be appealing but would considerably 
slow down or stop drug development altogether. After all, asking citizens to place 
themselves in harm’s way by taking drugs they do not need to assess their toxicity might be 
quite a duty call for most. Not to mention that even very altruistic subjects might be hesitant 
to volunteer to test drugs for a pharmaceutical industry that they might perceive as not 
trustworthy. Altruism would also deprive poor research subjects of much needed income.  
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Abadie’s comments are made with respect to professional volunteers in the United States, but the 
author suspects that they also apply to New Zealand. Professional volunteers are likely to be a 
necessity for Phase I research, so a prohibition of financial compensation is likely to impede 
clinical research in New Zealand. However, because there is limited data available on 
professional volunteers in New Zealand,152 this paper recommends that research should be 
conducted to determine whether professional volunteers are necessary for the viability of the 
clinical trial industry in New Zealand. 
 
(b) Fair payment 
 
The obvious solution to remedy the unfair advantage taken of professional volunteers would be 
to pay them more.153 An alternative proposal to address the issue of exploitation is therefore to 
ensure that professional volunteers are paid fairly. Abadie advocates for workers’ rights for 
volunteers, akin to the rights of other workers in risky occupations.154 In the author’s opinion, 
this would be unnecessary in the New Zealand context. As discussed in Part II(B) of this paper, 
the number of professional volunteers in New Zealand is likely to be small. Further, if 
professional volunteers have any issues with their “working conditions” they should be able to 
get redress under the Code of Rights. The Code provides for a comprehensive set of health 
consumer rights, which are supported by the Health and Disability Commissioner Advocacy 
system. Rights such as the right to be treated with respect, the right to freedom from 
discrimination and harassment and the right to services of an appropriate standard should be 
wide enough to ensure that clinical trial conditions are adequate.155  
 
A better solution would be to amend the Ethical Guidelines to expressly acknowledge that 
volunteers may be motivated to volunteer by financial reasons and to provide that financial 
payment must be fair. It would then fall to the ethics committee to determine, as part of the 
ethical approval process, whether the payment offered by a particular trial is fair in the 
circumstances. There are varying degrees of risk involved in Phase I clinical trials, which could 
test anything from a low risk anti-fungal cream, for example, to the high risk monoclonal 
antibody which was tested in the TGN1412 trial.156 Amongst other factors, such as time and the 
number of tests required, the ethics committee could take into account the level of risk involved 
in the trial, and evaluate payment accordingly. Paying trial participants according to risk, while a 
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controversial proposition, is not without support. For example, Jerry Menikoff from the 
University of Kansas rejects the rationale for compensation that our Ethical Guidelines are based 
on – that compensation is for time and inconvenience - on the basis that “risk assumption” is a 
volunteer’s true contribution:157 
 
After all, in other areas of society we do expect compensation to vary based on the amount of 
risk someone assumes. A fireman and a person who stacks boxes in a warehouse may 
perform similar physical tasks, yet the fireman gets paid far more due to the job risks. A 
research study involving administration of a new drug to a healthy subject may involve only 
two hours of a subject’s time, but the time involvement is a poor measure of the services 
provided by the subject. It would be a misleading comparison to suggest that this was the 
equivalent of working two hours behind the cash register at McDonald’s. It is equally 
misleading to say that a subject who swallows a well-studied medicine is performing a 
similar function to someone who swallows a pill in a Phase I study. 
 
This proposal will not stop clinical trials targeting poorer groups, because only those in need of 
money will volunteer, but it should stop clinical trials exploiting poor volunteers in the sense that 
they will be paid fair compensation for the risks they endure. Rather than adopting a paternalistic 
approach aiming to protect volunteers from financial inducements, this proposal acknowledges 
that volunteers provide a valuable service which is worthy of financial recognition.158 
 
Amending the Ethical Guidelines to include the requirement that volunteers be paid fair 
compensation, would require removal of the current limitations on the value of payment. This 
raises the issue of undue influence, illustrating the tension between exploitation and undue 
influence,159 which the Ethical Guidelines attempt to avoid by limiting payment. Undue 
influence is the major concern raised by ethicists in relation to the contentious issue of providing 
payment to research volunteers.160 Ethicists argue that volunteers can be unduly influenced by 
payment in two ways. Firstly, payment may cause a volunteer to ignore the risks of participating 
in a trial.161 In New Zealand, this concern can be rejected as argument for limiting financial 
compensation on the basis that it is already adequately dealt with by the right to informed 
consent under the Code of Rights. As we shall see in Part V(B), informed consent requires a 
volunteer to be fully informed of the risks of a study. This means that it is the responsibility of 
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the researcher to ensure, on a case-by-case basis, that volunteers do not ignore the risks of 
research and to prohibit volunteers from participating in trials if they do. The second concern 
advanced in relation to payment goes to the voluntariness of the decision to participate in 
research. Ethicists speak of “large incentives controlling individuals’ decisions in a way that is 
morally objectionable”,162 or financial payment “inducing prospective subjects to consent to 
participate in the research against their better judgment”.163 While it is possible that financial 
payments may, in some cases, affect the voluntariness of a volunteer’s decision in this way, the 
more likely scenario is that a volunteer will be legitimately and voluntarily motivated to 
participate by financial compensation. This distinction is well articulated by Alan Wertheimer in 
his commentary on exploitation in clinical research:164  
 
We must be careful to properly interpret the phrase “against their better judgment”. It is 
important to distinguish between two claims:  
 
1) The inducements constitute a seductive offer that motivates people to consent to 
participate when doing so does not advance their interests  
 
2) Given the people’s objective circumstance, the inducements make it rational for them to 
participate.  
 
Note that in (2) the inducements are large enough to render participation compatible with the 
participant’s better judgment given the objective conditions in which they find themselves, 
although participation might have been against their better judgment in the absence of those 
inducements or under different conditions. The real tragedy of poverty is not that (1) is often 
true, but that (2) is often true. 
 
Given this distinction, concerns about financial inducements amounting to undue influence are 
also better dealt with by the right to informed consent under the Code of Rights, rather than a 
blanket rule limiting payment (which exploits those who are legitimately motivated by financial 
inducements). Informed consent already requires consent to be “voluntary” or “freely given”,165 
so if financial payment compromises a volunteer’s ability to give free consent there will be a 
breach of the right to informed consent (and, given the analysis in Part III(C)(1), a breach of the 
right not to be subjected to medical experimentation without consent under the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990). In individual cases, financial compensation may induce a volunteer to 
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participate in a trial against their better judgement, rather than according to it. Such cases are, 
however, likely to be a “rare occurrence”.166 They are therefore better dealt with on a case-by-
case basis by the right to informed consent, and, by the researcher who has the benefit of 
evaluating the volunteer and the expertise to determine whether there is informed consent.  
 
This proposal ensures that professional volunteers are not exploited, but still requires researchers 
to comply with the requirements of informed consent. It is therefore consistent with the right not 
to be subjected to medical experimentation without consent,167 the right to informed consent and 
the right to freedom from exploitation.168 Although the Health and Disability Commissioner 
jurisprudence already provides extensive guidance on informed consent, if this proposal were to 
be adopted, specific guidance in the Ethical Guidelines as to how financial compensation may 
affect the voluntariness of consent may be necessary to ensure that researchers comply with their 
obligations under the Code of Rights and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  
 
By recognising that volunteers can have legitimate financial motivations for enrolling in a trial, 
rather than trying to protect them from such motivations, this proposal advances the underlying 
ethical objective of autonomy.169 Further, because it is likely that more people will volunteer in 
clinical trials if the financial payment is fair, thereby more widely distributing the risks of trial 
participation, this proposal advances the underlying ethical consideration of justice.170 
 
B Unregulated Compounded Risks 
 
Part 1 of this section will argue that professional volunteers are exposed to unregulated 
compounded risks (issue one), and that because the Ethical Guidelines fail to acknowledge the 
existence of repeat volunteers, it is unlikely that volunteers are properly informed of these risks. 
It will therefore be concluded that, in practice, researchers are likely to be in breach of the right 
to informed consent and the right not to be subjected to medical experimentation without consent 
(issue two).  
 
Part 2 of the section will put forward and critique two proposals to address these issues. The 
analysis will include a discussion of whether regulation should prevent volunteers from choosing 
to expose themselves to avoidable risks.  
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1 Issues 
 
(a) Issue one – exposure to unregulated compounded risks 
 
Participation in a Phase I clinical trial exposes a volunteer to uncertain and potentially life 
threatening adverse reactions. Risks to volunteers are based on pre-clinical data resulting from 
animal testing,171 but because the trial drug has never before been tested in human beings it can 
be difficult to predict how it will behave in humans.172 A harrowing example of this is the 
infamous TGN1412 study conducted in London in 2006. Six volunteers in this Phase I study 
suffered systemic organ failure, despite being administered doses of the experimental drug which 
were allegedly 500 times lower than the dose estimated as safe from pre-clinical studies.173 An 
investigation led by the United Kingdom Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
concluded that the pre-clinical testing had been adequate and the adverse reactions were caused 
by “an unpredicted biological action of the drug in humans”.174  
 
Safety risks are an inevitable part of participation in a clinical trial. This is particularly so for 
Phase I trials, the very purpose of which is to test drug safety.175 But in the case of professional 
volunteers, the safety risks of participation are even greater, because repeat participation 
compounds risk. As Jaillon observes:176 
 
…multiplying the number of investigational drugs absorbed by a subject over a relatively 
short period of time can considerably increase the risk of drug reaction and of severe adverse 
drug reaction.  
 
There is nothing to prevent a professional volunteer from choosing to expose themselves to these 
compounded risks. Risk assessment for clinical trials is conducted at the approval stage, by the 
Health Research Council of New Zealand’s Standing Committee on Therapeutic Trials. The 
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Standing Committee is only responsible for conducting a “scientific assessment” of the 
individual trial in question, and therefore does not have to consider the effects of long term 
participation in numerous trials on individual volunteers.177 Furthermore, the Ethical Guidelines 
do not prevent repeat trial participation, or limit the number of trials a volunteer can participate 
in. There is therefore no mandatory risk assessment of these compounded risks, which are left 
unregulated. In addition, the absence of a centralised database of trial participants makes it 
difficult to track the side effects of repeat trial participation and, as Abadie argues, the 
pharmaceutical industry has no incentive to invest in research into this area.178 One of the 
recommendations of this paper is therefore that research into the risks of repeat trial participation 
should be conducted.  
 
(b) Issue two – inadequate disclosure of compounded risks 
 
Although a volunteer can choose to accept the compounded risks of repeat trial participation, the 
author questions whether disclosure of these risks is likely to always occur in practice. Three 
arguments can be made to support this point: 
 
1) There is limited information available on the compounded risks of repeat trial 
participation, and the New Zealand regulatory framework does not recognise 
these risks. By contrast, the risks of participating in a particular trial, in isolation 
from other trials, are heavily regulated. Researchers are required to conduct pre-
clinical testing in order to estimate the toxicity of the trial drug in humans and the 
law requires this information to be submitted for assessment as part of the clinical 
trial approval process. Disclosure of the risks of trial participation is therefore 
likely to be based on the risks identified for the individual trial in question, and 
not on the largely unknown risks of repeat trial participation. 
 
2) There is no centralised database of clinical trial participants so a researcher’s 
knowledge of a volunteer’s history of repeat trial participation rests solely on 
disclosure by that volunteer. However, given the lack of publicity regarding 
compounded risks, a volunteer may not consider it necessary to disclose their 
history of trial participation. This accords with the research done by Abadie, who 
found that volunteers’ “perception[s] [of themselves] as ‘contractors’ being hired 
for individual trials made [them] consider the risks in the trial they were joining, 
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but they did not consider the cumulative result of drug interactions resulting from 
years of trial participation”.179  
 
3) The Code of Rights requires informed consent to experimental procedures to be in 
writing.180 It is standard practice for volunteers to read and sign a participant 
information sheet and consent form. A participant information sheet and consent 
form provides a detailed description of a particular trial including the purpose of 
the study, the requirements of participating in the study, the possible risks and 
benefits of the study and the rights of research participants.181 It is mandatory for 
researchers to submit a participant information sheet and consent form specific to 
their trial to an ethics committee for ethical approval before the trial can be 
conducted in New Zealand.182 This requires the ethics committee to review the 
participant information sheet and consent form for compliance with the Ethical 
Guidelines. The Ethical Guidelines, however, have been drafted to address the 
issues arising from an individual trial only, and do not acknowledge that 
participants may participate in multiple trials. The guidance provided on informed 
consent therefore focuses on informed consent to particular clinical trial, in 
isolation from informed consent to the numerous other trials a professional 
volunteer has consented to. There is therefore no guidance requiring a participant 
information sheet and consent form to disclose the compounded risks of repeat 
trial participation. While it is clear that a signed participant information sheet and 
consent form alone is not enough to satisfy the requirement of informed 
consent,183 the researcher’s disclosure of risks is likely to be based on the 
information in the participant information sheet and consent form and may 
therefore not include adequate disclosure of the compounded risks of repeat 
participation.  
 
If a researcher does not disclose the compounded risks of repeat trial participation to a 
professional volunteer, that volunteer will be unable to give informed consent to participate in a 
trial. Informed consent is protected as a right in New Zealand by right seven of the Code of 
Rights, which provides that “services may be provided to a consumer only if that consumer 
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makes an informed choice and gives informed consent”.184 Recent Health and Disability 
Commissioner decisions have interpreted the Code so that a breach of the right to be fully 
informed (right 6) results in a breach of the right to informed consent; the rationale being that if 
the health consumer does not receive sufficient information, he/she is not in a position to make 
an informed choice and give informed consent.185 Right 6 requires disclosure of the expected 
risks and side effects of trial participation. Thus, if participants in clinical trials are not 
adequately informed of the expected risks and side effects of their participation in the trial, there 
will be no informed consent. Right 6(2) provides the “the most obvious requirements” for what 
qualifies as adequate disclosure for the purposes of informed consent.186 It provides:187 
 
Right 6 –Right to be Fully Informed 
(2) Before making a choice or giving consent, every consumer has the right to the 
information that a reasonable consumer, in that consumer's circumstances, needs to make an 
informed choice or give informed consent. 
 
The test is therefore based on the “reasonable consumer”, but it also incorporates a subjective 
element:188 
 
The test of what information should be supplied incorporates the objective element of the 
'reasonable consumer' but considers this in light of the particular circumstances of the 
consumer whose rights are at issue, which is a subjective overlay.  
 
The subjective element of the reasonable consumer test makes it clear that the assessment of risk 
must be “tailored” to the individual volunteer’s circumstances.189 Adequate disclosure, in the 
case of a professional volunteer, would therefore require assessment of the risks of a particular 
trial, given the volunteer’s individualised history of trial participation. This means that the 
compounded risks of repeat trial participation need to be disclosed to a professional volunteer 
before he/she can give legally effective informed consent under the Code of Rights. Given the 
analysis in Part III(C)(1), these risks also need to be disclosed in order for there to be consent for 
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the purposes of the right not to be subjected to medical experimentation without consent under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The point made in this section of the paper is that the 
lack of guidance on these increased risks makes it is likely that the compounded risks of repeat 
participation are not always adequately disclosed to professional volunteers. 
 
2 Proposals for reform 
 
This part of the paper will put forward and critique two proposals for addressing the two issues 
discussed above – exposure to unregulated compounded risks and inadequate disclosure of 
compounded risks. Paragraph (a) will evaluate the option of limiting the number of trials that 
volunteers can participate in and paragraph (b) will argue that participant information sheet and 
consent forms should be required to disclose the compounded risks of repeat trial participation.  
 
(a) Limit the number of trials a volunteer can participate in 
 
To cap the risk to which professional volunteers can expose themselves, a limit could be placed 
on the number of trials that a volunteer can participate in. This practice has been adopted in 
France.190 This also appears to be the solution favoured by Abadie.191 Such a limit would be 
inconsistent with the ethical principle of autonomy, because it would restrict the ability of 
professional volunteers to make their own decisions about the level of risk they are willing to 
accept. Although the right to informed consent is based in autonomy, informed consent is not the 
same thing as autonomy and it does not follow here that restricting autonomy breaches the right 
to informed consent. The right to informed consent does not mean that professional volunteers 
have a right to participate in limitless trials. The right is much narrower than this, providing that 
“services may be provided to a consumer only if that consumer makes an informed choice and 
gives informed consent”.192 This proposed limit therefore does not breach the right to informed 
consent under the Code of Rights.  
 
Although autonomy is a dominant principle of medical ethics which, as explained Part IV, does 
influence the development of regulation, autonomy is not absolute and it needs to be balanced 
against other interests. The wider regulatory framework in this case supports taking a 
paternalistic approach to the regulation of safety risks. Individual clinical trials are rigorously 
assessed for safety to participants as part of the scientific approval process discussed in Part 
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II(C). Researchers are required to exclude particular participants from trials if they meet 
exclusion criteria, which are aimed at protecting volunteers who have a greater risk of 
experiencing adverse drug reactions or complications. If, after approval, the risks of a study are 
determined to be unacceptable the study will be terminated. In this context, it would be 
inconsistent to leave the compounded risks of repeat participation completely unregulated. 
Furthermore, limiting the risk that professional volunteers can expose themselves to advances the 
underlying ethical considerations of justice and non-maleficence, upon which the Ethical 
Guidelines are based.193 Ethical justice requires that “vulnerable members of a community 
should not bear disproportionate burdens of studies from which other members of the community 
are intended to benefit”.194 The risks of trial participation are pooled in professional volunteers, 
yet the research is not intended to benefit them (at least directly) because they are healthy 
volunteers. Limiting the risks that volunteers can expose themselves to will reduce this pooling, 
and more evenly distribute the burden of research.195 It is also consistent with the obligation not 
to inflict harm on others, which is encompassed by the principle of non-maleficence.  
 
Ultimately, any limit to the number of trials a volunteer can participate in should be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the individual volunteer’s risk profile, based on their 
specific history of trial participation. While there is limited information available on the risks of 
repeat trial participation, it is possible that there will be some cases in which the safety risks 
justify a limit. As explained above, a safety-based limit to autonomy is justifiable in light of the 
surrounding regulatory framework. The Ethical Guidelines should therefore be amended to 
acknowledge the risks of repeat participation, and to provide guidance to researchers to exclude 
participants from trials on the basis of unacceptable safety risks.  
 
(b) Require participant information sheet and consent forms to disclose the compounded risks 
of repeat trial participation 
 
In order to ensure that professional volunteers are always made aware of the risks of repeat trial 
participation, the Ethical Guidelines should be amended to require participant information sheet 
and consent forms to disclose these increased risks. Of course, any disclosure would have to be 
generalised, because participant information sheet and consent forms are standardised to a 
particular trial. However, such a disclosure would alert both volunteers and researchers to the 
compounded risks of trial participation, forming the basis for a more individualised discussion of 
risks.  
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By ensuring that researchers comply with their obligations of information disclosure, this 
proposal is consistent with the right to informed consent under the Code of Rights, and, given the 
discussion in Part IIIC(1), it is also consistent with the right not to be subjected to medical 
experimentation without consent under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
 
C Dehumanisation and Commodification  
 
Dehumanisation and commodification of the human body are the two most difficult issues of 
professional trial participation and, as explained below,196 they are likely to form part of the 
reason why professional volunteers are not recognised by the existing regulatory framework. 
Both issues relate to a disembodiment of self, which Abadie describes as follows: 197 
 
One of the most important critiques of the pharmaceutical industry and the commodification 
of bodies in trials research is that the process not only exploits but dehumanises research 
subjects. The tendency of research subjects to identify themselves with guinea pigs conveys 
well this notion of disembodied self. It is also not rare for volunteers to resort to images of 
torture, sex work, or prostitution when describing their activities. And their emergent 
solidarity as professionals…and their everyday forms of resistance at work draw attention to 
their efforts to reassert their human condition. 
 
Part 1 of this section will argue that the Ethical Guidelines, in failing to recognise the existence 
of professional volunteers, or even that volunteers may be motivated by financial reward, fail to 
address the dehumanisation (discussed in paragraph (a)) and commodification (discussed in 
paragraph (b)) experienced by professional volunteers.  
Part 2 of this section will put forward and critique two proposals for addressing the issues of 
dehumanisation and commodification. 
 
1 Issues 
 
(a) A dehumanising profession  
 
Professional trial participation can be viewed as dehumanising. The fact that professional 
volunteers commonly identify themselves as professional guinea pigs is evidence of this.198 
  
196 See Part VI.  
197 Abadie, above n 4, at 10-11.  
198 At 47. 
38  
Further, the accounts from self-identified professional guinea pigs in Abadie’s book support this 
view. One interviewee referred to his profession in the “torture economy” as follows:199 
 
…you are not asked to produce or to do something anymore, you are being asked to endure 
something. So if you are a guinea pig you are enduring something, people are doing things to 
you and you are just enduring it, you are not actually producing something…It’s a different 
type of activity, I still feel that there is some work in it but the nature of the work has 
changed. And I am letting people pay me in exchange for the control they have over me. 
 
Another interviewee describes the profession as “dehumanising”:200 
 
…you are paid to take this risk and also for this kind of weird dehumanisation. It’s funny, 
what gets me the most is getting EKGS [electrocardiograms], I guess. And it’s funny because 
it’s for my safety and it’s not invasive, has no side effects, but I take my clothes off and these 
people start putting things over my naked chest and then is when I feel like a guinea pig 
more than a worker…It’s something that most people wouldn’t get through. The guinea pig 
part is also because they pay you just to demean you to animal status, you are just letting 
yourself be measured by the functions of your organs and stuff, something that most people 
wouldn’t agree with.  
 
The Ethical Guidelines do not address this issue because they do not acknowledge the existence 
of professional volunteers. The Code of Rights is also likely to be of limited use. While the rights 
to dignity and respect are relevant to dehumanising treatment,201 it is unlikely that professional 
volunteering breaches these rights. The rights in the Code of Rights place obligations on health 
care providers in respect of a particular health service. This means that as long as a researcher in 
a particular trial complies with the Code of Rights, there will be no breach. The issue of a 
dehumanising profession, however, cannot be isolated to a single trial. It is the cumulative result 
of participation in a number of trials. The currently regulatory framework therefore does not 
adequately address this issue.  
 
(b) Commodification of the human body 
 
Professional trial participation can also be viewed as a type of commodification of the human 
body. While not as extreme as the sale of organs, professional volunteers are paid to be 
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experimented on and in this sense they do “sell their bodies to science”. Abadie explains this 
well in his book: 202 
 
Paying healthy people to test drugs that they don’t need is another step toward 
commodifying the body in biomedicine. But unlike those who sell a kidney or plasma, 
professional guinea pigs see their whole bodies become the commodity. Trial subjects are 
well aware of how valuable their bodies are, despite the protestations of the pharmaceutical 
industry that subjects are volunteers being compensated just for their time. They see 
themselves as workers, entering a professional and contractual relationship with the industry. 
Trials are their business, a way of making quick, easy money. 
 
The Ethical Guidelines completely avoid this issue by not recognising that volunteers may be 
solely or primarily motivated to volunteer by financial compensation, let alone that they may 
participate in clinical trials as a profession. In relation to “benefits to participants”, the 
Guidelines provide that:203 
 
People have a range of motives for participating in intervention studies. These can include 
gaining benefit for themselves or for other individuals in the future, helping to contribute to 
knowledge, and contributing benefits to communities, including benefit sharing and 
reciprocity 
 
This focus on altruism reflects the general characterisation of research participants as 
“volunteers” rather than workers motivated by financial incentives (although the Ethical 
Guidelines themselves, for the most part, refer to volunteers as participants, not volunteers).204 
While this allows the Ethical Guidelines to avoid the difficult issue of commodification, it 
ignores the reality that professional volunteers do allow their bodies to be tested on in exchange 
for money, and that most of them are not altruistically motivated. The refusal of the Ethical 
Guidelines to recognise the commodification of professional volunteers does not stop their 
commodification, but it does stop researchers and ethics committees from being able to engage 
appropriately with this issue.   
 
2 Proposals for reform 
 
This part of the paper will put forward and critique two proposals for addressing the issues of 
commodification and dehumanisation. Paragraph (a) will evaluate the option of prohibiting 
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professional trial participation and paragraph (b) will argue that, in the absence of legislative 
intervention, the Ethical Guidelines should be amended to recognise professional volunteers as a 
class of research participants. 
 
(a) Prohibit professional trial participation 
 
Dehumanisation is an inherent and inescapable part of professional volunteering. Phase I trials 
are likely to require volunteers to be subjected to extensive testing, including periodic blood and 
urine tests, electrocardiograms and scans. Volunteers may be required to fast. The side effects 
from the drugs they test are likely to cause discomfort (or worse). Throughout the trial volunteers 
will be closely monitored. They may be required to stay at a clinical research facility for many 
days as an inpatient, and they may be woken throughout the night for testing. They may be 
required to refrain from unprotected sex for some time (maybe months) after participation. All of 
this contributes to the dehumanising nature of the profession, yet it is a necessary part of the 
clinical trial process. Therefore, the most effective means of addressing the dehumanisation of 
professional volunteers would be to prohibit professional trial participation. This would also be a 
potential solution to the commodification issue.  
 
On the other hand, prohibiting professional trial participation would be inconsistent with the 
underlying ethical principle of autonomy, because it would prevent professional volunteers from 
choosing this profession. If regulation were to be solely based on the principle of autonomy, it 
would allow professional volunteers to consent to their dehumanisation and commodification. 
However, although autonomy is a dominant principle of medical ethics which, as explained in 
Part IV, does influence the development of regulation, autonomy is not absolute and it needs to 
be balanced against other interests.  
 
In analogous areas, such as paid surrogacy and property in human body parts, legislation has 
been enacted to override autonomy and prohibit commodification of the human body. The 
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 prohibits and criminalises the commercial 
supply of human embryos or gametes and commercial surrogacy arrangements.205 The Human 
Tissue Act 2008 generally prohibits and criminalises trading in human tissue,206 which is 
consistent with the common law’s general position that there can be no property in the human 
body. Thus, comparable regulation could provide justification for a prohibition on the 
commercialisation of human bodies for the purpose of clinical trials.   
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Commercial surrogacy is particularly analogous to paid clinical trial participation, in the sense 
that in both practices a person’s entire body becomes a commodity. Before the Human Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2004, there was no legal ban on commercial surrogacy in New 
Zealand.207 However, at that time, it was the practice of the National Ethics Committee on 
Assisted Human Reproduction (which was responsible for giving ethical approval to fertility 
clinics)208 to only authorise altruistic surrogacy.209 The National Ethics Committee on Assisted 
Human Reproduction had, in 1997, agreed “to give ethical approval in principle for non-
commercial altruistic surrogacy” and it subsequently developed “draft guidelines for non-
commercial altruistic surrogacy using IVF as treatment”.210 The focus of regulation has therefore 
always been on altruistic surrogacy. In enacting the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Act 2004, Parliament appears to have largely defaulted to this position,211 and it is not clear from 
the legislative history exactly what Parliament’s rationale for prohibiting commercial surrogacy 
was.212 Commercial surrogacy can be objected to on the basis that it commodifies the surrogate 
mother’s body.213 Of itself, this may be seen as a sufficient reason to warrant a prohibition of 
commercial surrogacy if commodification is characterised as “fail[ing] to respect or value human 
bodies in the appropriate way”.214 However, other objections to commercial surrogacy are likely 
to have influenced Parliament’s decision to prohibit it. Commercial surrogacy can be objected to 
on the basis that it is exploitative.215 It can also be viewed as violating the rights of the child.216 
The commodification of the resulting child in surrogacy, or “baby selling” (as distinct from the 
commodification of the surrogate mother’s body), is a particularly common objection.217 
Returning to our underlying ethical principle, autonomy, the commodification of babies in 
surrogacy can be viewed as more ethically problematic than the commodification of the 
surrogate mother, because the surrogate mother can consent to the commodification, but the baby 
cannot. In the case of professional trial participants the analogy is drawn to the commodification 
of the surrogate mother, not the child, because professional trial participants also consent to their 
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commodification. Given that the rationale for prohibiting commercial surrogacy may therefore 
have been based in a number of objections, Parliament may not consider it necessary to prohibit 
professional volunteering on the sole ground that it commodifies research participants. 
 
For the reasons outlined below, the author supports the proposal set out in (b) – to amend the 
Ethical Guidelines to recognise professional volunteers as a class of research participants. 
However, given that legislation has been necessary in analogous areas, this paper recommends 
that the commercialisation of clinical trial participation warrants legislative attention. As 
discussed, this does not necessarily mean that professional trial participation will be prohibited, 
because commercial trial participation may be distinguishable. Further, in practice, clinical trial 
participation is already commercialised and this is something which is silently accepted as a 
necessary part of the clinical trial process. The author suspects that the uncomfortable, but 
unavoidable, reality is that our need for medical progress will outweigh any issues we may have 
with the dehumanisation and commodification that the commercialisation of trial participation 
presents. However, such a conclusion can only be reached by evidence-based policy decisions. 
Research into the necessity (or otherwise) of professional volunteers to the clinical trial industry 
will be required for this purpose.  
 
If, ultimately, it is decided that a prohibition on professional trial participation is not justified, 
Parliament could adopt the approach taken to prostitution – an occupation which, as discussed 
above, professional volunteers identify with – to avoid the “moral issues” associated with 
commodification and dehumanisation. The Prostitution Reform Act 2004 recognises that 
prostitution presents issues warranting regulation, but neither endorses nor morally sanctions 
prostitution.218 This illustrates that regulation can be used to address harms without making a 
moral judgment. In any event, the social utility of clinical trial participation is likely to mean that 
society will accept it as less morally objectionable than prostitution, and therefore any issues of 
morality are likely to be more easily circumvented.  
 
(b) Recognise professional volunteers as a class of research participants  
 
The Human Assisted Reproductive Technology and Human Tissue Acts are evidence that 
regulation needs to address, rather than ignore, the comparable issues which arise in the case of 
professional volunteers. At the very least, the Ethical Guidelines should be amended to recognise 
the existence of professional volunteers as a class of research participants. The Ethical 
Guidelines already recognise a number of specific categories of vulnerable research participants, 
including older people, students, prison inmates and employees, and provide specific guidance 
  
218 Prostitution Reform Act 2004, s 3.  
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on the various issues that arise from research on such participants.219 By recognising the 
existence of professional volunteers, the Ethical Guidelines would pave the way for an open 
discussion of the issues that this unique class of research participants presents.  
 
This proposal would not prevent the dehumanisation and commodification of professional 
volunteers, which is an inescapable part of the profession. However, the fact that professional 
volunteers are currently ignored in New Zealand, and generally at an international level, is likely 
to contribute to the negative perception of their profession. Recognition and discussion of the 
issues facing professional volunteers should reduce the alienation of this profession, thereby 
making it less dehumanising. This is consistent with Abadie’s findings, who describes the 
resistance movements and assertions of identify from professional guinea pigs in the United 
States as “efforts to reassert their human condition”.220 
 
VI Recommendations 
 
Professional volunteers are currently unrecognised and unregulated as a class of research 
participants. As explained above, this is despite the Ethical Guidelines specifically recognising 
and providing guidance on other classes of research participants. Professional trial participants 
are likely to be a relatively small population in New Zealand,221 and the issues which they face 
are not widely publicised. This might be one of the reasons why they are ignored by the Ethical 
Guidelines. In addition, regulation in this area tends to be prompted by an event which highlights 
the inadequacies of the law. For example, the TGN1412 tragedy in the United Kingdom 
prompted reform of the regulation of Phase I trials.222 In the United States, the Tuskegee syphilis 
experiments prompted the Belmont Report which reformed research ethics.223 Here in New 
Zealand, it was not until after the “Unfortunate Experiment at National Women’s” and the 
release of the Cartwright Inquiry that the law of health consumer rights was radically 
reformed.224 However, the lack of regulation is also likely to be a result of regulators’ reluctance 
to address the difficult issues of dehumanisation and commodification which arise in the case of 
professional volunteers. Indeed, New Zealand regulation does seem to deliberately avoid these 
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issues. As this paper has demonstrated, the Ethical Guidelines stress unrealistically that trial 
volunteers will have altruistic motivations. Further, industry practice seems to follow an 
unspoken rule that volunteers must be said to be compensated for “inconvenience”, rather than 
paid for work. In relation to compensation given to trial participants, a 2012 Stuff article on 
“human guinea pigs” said, without authority: “they’re not allowed to call it payment”.225 As 
Abadie explains, this contradiction is encapsulated by the oxymoron “paid volunteer”: 226 
 
As with organ transplantation, pharmaceutical corporations that conduct trials avoid referring 
to the commodification of the body in an attempt to maintain public trust. …The industry 
refers to trial subjects with the oxymoron “paid volunteer,” the pretence being that they are 
compensated not for their labour but for their “time and travel expenses”. 
 
Yet, professional volunteers exist despite the regulatory framework failing to acknowledge them. 
And as this paper has demonstrated, there are issues which arise in respect of this profession (in 
part because the regulatory framework ignores them) that need to be addressed. This paper 
therefore makes recommendations for further research and regulatory reform. The 
recommendations for further research can be summarised as follows: 
 
1 Conduct empirical research into professional volunteers in New Zealand. 
2 Conduct research into the risks associated with repeat trial participation. 
3 Conduct research to determine whether professional volunteers are necessary for the 
viability of the clinical trial industry in New Zealand. 
 
With regards to the recommendations for reform, the discussion in Part V(C)(2)(a) led to the 
conclusion that professional trial participation warrants parliamentary attention. This is 
particularly so given the reluctance of the current regulators (the National Ethics Advisory 
Committee) to address the issues of commodification and dehumanisation. The status quo, 
however, cannot be maintained. In the event that Parliament does not intervene, this paper 
recommends that the Ethical Guidelines should be amended to recognise professional volunteers 
as a specific class of research participants, and to provide specific guidance on the issues that 
arise for these volunteers. In particular, the Ethical Guidelines should be amended to: 
 
1 Acknowledge the risks of repeat participation, and provide guidance to researchers to 
limit participation in appropriate cases. 
  
225 Nikki Macdonald, above n 22.  
226 Abadie, above n 4, at 9. 
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2 Require participant information sheet and consent forms to disclose the compounded 
risks of repeat trial participation. 
3 Expressly acknowledge that volunteers may be motivated to volunteer by financial 
reasons and to provide that financial compensation must be fair.  
 
VII Conclusion 
 
Clinical trials are already subject to comprehensive regulation. The Medicines Act 1981, Ethical 
Guidelines, Code of Rights and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provide extensive 
protection to research participants, ensuring that, in general, research is ethical and scientifically 
sound. Calls for amendments or additional regulation in this highly regulated area of law need to 
be considered with caution. Regulation consumes resources and can restrict autonomy. Further, 
over-regulation could lead to pharmaceutical companies taking their clinical trials elsewhere.227 
Therefore, any recommendations to increase regulation in this area should only be acted upon if 
they are necessary and justifiable in light of these considerations.  
 
This paper has argued that professional volunteers fall through the gaps of current regulation, 
presenting unique issues which need to be recognised. This problem is not unique to New 
Zealand. At an international level professional volunteers are “a virtually unnoticed sub-
population of [healthy] volunteers”.228 While the issues presented by professional volunteers 
appear to be largely untouched in New Zealand, there is considerable commentary on 
professional volunteers and calls for their regulation in other parts of the world. Abadie’s book, 
which has formed the basis for discussion in this paper, provides a convincing argument for 
regulation in the United States. The recommendations proposed for New Zealand in this paper 
are largely directed at amending the Ethical Guidelines. They only require minor amendments to 
the existing regulatory framework which can be implemented with little cost. A comprehensive 
review of the Ethical Guidelines is planned for 2015, so the recommendations could be 
considered as part of this review process, which would also limit cost.229  
 
The issues discussed in this paper are by no means the only issues presented by professional 
volunteers.  Further, the recommendations advanced will not provide all the answers, and are 
only intended to be a starting point for discussion. This is a highly specialised and technical area 
of law which requires input and discussion from a wide range of groups, including lawyers, 
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clinicians, researchers and trial participants. What this paper hopes to achieve is to show that 
New Zealand needs to have this discussion.  
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